προτάσεις:
Eckhart
Arnold
Ορισμός αλτρουϊσμού
Explaining
Altruism
ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΚΗ
ΣΚΕΨΗ
A trait or a type of behavior
of an individual is called altruistic
if it benefits another individual at a cost for the individual itself without
immediate or equal return. Some behavior is thus altruistic,
/
- 1. if it is beneficial for another individual
/
- 2. and if it is costly for oneself
/-
3. and if an equal return is not guaranteed
/ - 4. and if the altruist chooses (or, in case of non-intentional
animal behavior, simply if it depends on the altruist) whether the transfer of
benefits takes place
Τhe definition is designed to be wide
enough to cover both reciprocal altruism and genuine altruism.
Reciprocal altruism
is altruism on the premise that the bestowed benefits will be returned, but
with a certain risk that this might not happen. (Only when the latter is
excluded, it is, according to the definition, not called “altruism”, any more.
This would be the case if the return was immediate.) Thus, even when favors are
reciprocated we speak of altruism, but we only speak of altruism when there
exists an opportunity for cheating.
Genuine altruism on the
other hand means that it is sure that the costs for benefiting other
individuals will never be returned. In a biological setting a certain
behavioral trait of an individual is genuinely altruistic if it helps
increasing the reproduction rate of some other individual and at the same time
decreases the reproduction rate of itself. That this is indeed possible and that
therefore genuine altruism can survive in nature despite the fact that the
survival of some phenotypic trait crucially depends on its increasing the
reproduction rate of its bearer over his or her competitors, is one of the most
astonishing results of group selection.
There are also a few other
points that have to be noted about the above definition of altruism. Although
the questions discussed in this study have a moral connotation as well, the
definition above is purely descriptive.
The difference this makes can
be explained as follows: When speaking of “cooperation” or “altruism” the moral
connotation usually suggests that cooperation and altruism are generally good
and laudable. But this is not necessarily the case: The (illegal)
pre-arrangement of prices by competitors on a market, for example, is certainly
not a laudable case of cooperation and it could hardly be labeled “altruism”
because – since altruism is commonly considered laudable – the word would not
be used in cases of cooperation that seem ethically doubtful in the broader
context.
The problem that this example
exposes is, however, not a problem specific of the above definition of
altruism, but a fundamental problem of moral philosophy: Moral philosophy tries
to classify human actions and attitudes into categories of good and bad. But
even actions that are generally thought of as being morally laudable can, when
appropriate circumstances are given, turn out to be morally deplorable. Killing
people is generally considered bad and saving lives is good, but for a soldier
in war killing people is a virtue. The problem has to do with the contextuality of moral attributes. To
avoid false conclusions this kind of contextuality should be borne in mind.
In addition to the fact that
altruism is typically considered to be morally laudable, there exists a more
specific reason, why the descriptive definition of “altruism” given above is
important for the discussion of ethical questions. Even if “altruism” in a
descriptive sense can also be applied to cases of illegal or antimoral
conspiracy, it is hardly imag inable (except may be for extreme ethical
standpoints like Nietzsche’s “Herrenmoral” or Ayn Rand’s “Objectivism”) that
there can be such a thing as moral conduct that does not involve altruism in
any form.
Altruism in a descriptive sense
thus seems to be a necessary though not sufficient condition for morality.
Moral conduct typically demands from the individual to follow certain norms
even though this may be costly and even when no reward is assured. Thus the
questions of whether and to what extent morality has a chance to flourish in a
competitive world crucially depends on the question of whether altruism in the
descriptive sense is possible in a competitive world.
The above definition of
altruism does not contain any psychological or teleological elements such as
intention (if humans are meant) or functional design (if organisms are
concerned) directed towards benefiting the other. This might appear odd at
first sight because cases of involuntarily benefiting others or of benefits
which are mere side effects do not seem to be excluded (as they should).
As an example a tree that casts
a shadow during a hot summer day might be taken. The tree’s shade is most
welcome for humans resting under it. But is the tree’s casting a shadow
therefore to be called an example of biological altruism? The obvious objection
would be that the tree is not designed to provide needful humans or animals
with a pleasant shade on a hot summer day. It is designed to catch sunlight for
photosynthesis, the shade being an unintended side effect. To call this
“altruism” would surely overstretch the meaning of the word. This objection
would be valid, but luckily cases like this one are covered by the requirement
that altruism should be costly. There are no extra costs for the tree to cast a
shadow. Thus casting shadows does not count as altruistic according to our
definition.
(Biologists sometimes treat
this kind of phenomena under the heading of “byproduct mutualism”, where
“byproduct mutualism” can be regarded as a degenerate case of altruism
(Dugatkin, 1997, p. 42).
From an empirical point of view
it is quite reasonable to discuss byproduct mutualism in connection with
altruism because 1) it is often very hard to distinguish empirically whether
some kind of behavior is an instance of, say, reciprocal altruism or merely
byproduct mutualism and 2) there is evidence that in many cases byproduct
mutualism is a stepping stone in the evolutionary path that leads to the
development of altruism. )
But if the tree were an apple
tree then its growing fruits would legitimately be called altruistic because
growing fruits involves a cost for the tree. It does not matter here that the
tree is a plant and therefore cannot have intentions. Presumably, the tree’s
growing fruits is a case of reciprocal altruism, as the humans or animals
eating the apples might help the tree to spread its seeds in return.
One might even take this
question a step further by arguing that while merely accidental benefits for
others are excluded by the criterion of cost, this leaves open the possibility
for altruistic acts that are not bestowed from a benefactor on a beneficiary
but reaped from the benefactor by force. An example would be a rabbit that is
eaten by a fox. It would not help to reintroduce the notion of functional
design into the definition because a rabbit is – in a way – perfectly well
designed to serve as fox food. Absurd cases like that of the rabbit that
altruistically lends itself to be eaten by a fox or – to take an example from
social life – of crime victims that serve as altruistic benefactors to robbers,
thieves and burglars are ruled out by the fourth criterion, according to which
it must depend on the altruist whether the transfer of benefits takes place.
The criterion is wide enough to capture altruistic actions by humans as well as
animals. Even though it may not be apparent at first sight, the criterion can
also be applied to inborn (or genetically determined) altruistic traits as they
occur in mutualisms. [A mutualism is an interspecific association of different
species to their mutual benefit. An example would be the association of hermit
crabs and sea anemones.]
In this case “to depend” means
two things: 1) that it is a genetically determined trait of the altruist that
makes the transfer of benefits possible and 2) the altruist could also exist
without this trait. The choice of costs rather than intentions as a criterion
for altruism has the advantage that it is more objective and that it can be
applied equally in biological and sociological settings without the need for
differentiating between human intentions, animal intentions, mere functional
design of primitive organisms that do not have intentions etc. Furthermore, in
a sociological setting the assumption is certainly unproblematic that whenever
some altruistic act needs a certain effort, it will not be performed without
the intention to perform it.
There is, however, also a
downside to neglecting intentions in the definition of altruism. In everday
life, especially when human relations like friendship and love are concerned,
there exists a distinction which is closely connected to the psychological
aspects of altruism and which is at the same time crucial for the valuation of
altruism: The distinction between real or true altruism on the one hand and
false or merely pretended altruism on the other hand.
Altruism is commonly regarded
as true only if the benefits one person bestows unto another are given for the
sake of the other person and not merely out of egoistic motives like prestige
or the hope for a reward. In the latter case the kind of altruism displayed
would be regarded as merely pretended and not as honest. Such psychological
subtleties are not covered by the above definition of altruism, which is
designed to be operational in the first place. Still, should the question
arise, the definition of altruism can easily be ren dered more precise,
especially so, since the distinction between altruism out of friendship and
opportunistic altruism also leaves its mark in the outer world: As the
psychological findings indicate, the kind of altruism that friendship evokes is
reciprocal only on a long term basis and even defies short term reciprocity
(Silk, 2003).
As a final remark, it should be
noted that there exists a very specifically philosophical question about
altruism, which will only be discussed here briefly and in the following be
left out completely. It is the question whether true altruism is possible at all.
It could be argued that whenever a person behaves altruistically, he or she
does so only because he or she derives at least an emotional reward of some
kind such as, say, personal satisfaction. But then – as the argument runs – the
action would not be truly altruistic any more because it is done for one’s own
satisfaction. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that anybody can do anything
without at least some kind of inner reward. Only a perfect saint might be able
to commit the most gracious acts of altruism and charity and at the same time
be wholly disgusted by what he is doing. If one insists on speaking of true
altruism only where it reaches a level of perfect saintliness then there is no
altruism in this world. But as long as it is not deliverance that is sought and
the problem of altruism is confined to how and to what extent altruism has a
chance to emerge in natural and cultural evolution, it is safe to assume that
already levels of altruism below perfect saintliness can be morally
satisfactory.
from Chapter 2
2.2. The Definition of Alrtruism pp. 15-20
Υπερσύνδεση:
Explaining
Altruism A Simulation-Based Approach and its ...
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[ ανάρτηση 3 Δεκεμβρίου 2024 :
προτάσεις:
Eckhart Arnold
Ορισμός
αλτρουϊσμού
Explaining Altruism
ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΚΗ ΣΚΕΨΗ ]
