Pamela
Pansardi
Power and Domination
Pamela Pansardi
“Democracy, Domination and the distribution of Power : Substantive
Political Equality as a Procedural Requirement”
Revue international de philosophie 2016 /
1 (n. 275) pp. 91-108
The origin of the modern idea
of democracy can be described as theoretically intertwined with a normative
critique of the role played by power in political societies. The democratic
ideal, as emerging from the work of Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau, is
intrinsically related to a certain interpretation of the ideal of a limitation
of power. The doctrine of the separation of powers, introduced by the first two
authors, as well as the notion of the sovereignty of the General Will at the basis
of Rousseau’s political thought – as opposed to what he describes as
a situation of alienation and enslavement of the people, inevitably resulting
from monocratic government (2008: 17) – are attempts to provide
normative guidelines for the creation of a legitimate society.
At the basis of the idea of democracy there
is, then, the idea of the dispersion of power. However, the value of democratic
institutions is not to be found in the achievement of an equal distribution of
power among the citizens of a society per se: The distribution of
power is instrumental to more fundamental goods, such as the protection of
individual freedom and, even more prominently, the ‘equal consideration of
individual interests’ (Dahl 1989: 86) in the collective decision-making
process.
ΜΕΤΑΦΡΑΣΗ:
Η προέλευση
της σύγχρονης ιδέας της δημοκρατίας μπορεί να περιγραφεί ως θεωρητικά
συνυφασμένη με μια φιλοσοφική κριτική του ρόλου που παίζει η εξουσία (power) στις
πολιτικές κοινωνίες. Το δημοκρατικό ιδεώδες, όπως έχει διαμορφωθεί μέσω του
έργου του Λοκ, του Μοντεσκιέ και του Ρουσσώ, είναι εσωτερικά συνδεδεμένο με μια
συγκεκριμένη ερμηνεία του ιδανικού μιας περιορισμένης εξουσίας (του περιορισμού
της εξουσίας: of limitation of power).
Η διδασκαλία
του διαχωρισμού/διάκρισης των εξουσιών, που εισήγαγαν οι δύο πρώτοι συγγραφείς,
καθώς και η έννοια της κυριαρχίας της γενικής βούλησης (general will) που
βρίσκεται στη βάση του πολιτικού στοχασμού του Ρουσσώ - αντίθετα με αυτό που αυτός
περιγράφει ως μια κατάσταση αλλοτρίωσης και υποδούλωσης του λαού, που
αναπόφευκτα οδηγεί σε μονοκρατική κυβέρνηση (2008: 17) - είναι προσπάθειες να
παρέχουν φιλοσοφικές κατευθυντήριες γραμμές για τη δημιουργία μιας νόμιμης
κοινωνίας (legitimate society).
Στη βάση της
ιδέας της δημοκρατίας βρίσκεται, λοιπόν, η ιδέα της διάχυσης της εξουσίας (disperse of power). Ωστόσο, η
αξία των δημοκρατικών θεσμών δεν εντοπίζεται στην επίτευξη μιας ίσης κατανομής/διανομής
της εξουσίας (an equal distribution of power) μεταξύ των
πολιτών μιας κοινωνίας καθεαυτής: η διανομή της εξουσίας είναι όργανο για την
υπεράσπιση πιο θεμελιωδών αγαθών, όπως η προστασία της ατομικής ελευθερίας και,
ακόμα πιο έντονα, η "ίση αντιμετώπιση/συνεξέταση των ατομικών
συμφερόντων" (Dahl 1989: 86) στη διαδικασία λήψης συλλογικών αποφάσεων.
In practice, the ideal of the dispersion of
power (or of a particular distribution of power) has been implemented in the progressive
extension of rights of political participation. All the citizens in a
liberal-democratic society are entitled to the right to vote and, in most of
cases, to be elected. However, despite the equal possession of political
rights, certain individuals in our societies are seen as more powerful than
others, and certain are seen as benefitting more in the advancement of their
own interests than others.
Certain individuals or groups’ interests,
moreover, seem to be systematically ignored in the political decision-making
process. Despite the presence of representative institutions and civil and
political liberties, contemporary liberal democracies are far from being
describable as relying on an equal distribution of power.
The inequality in the distribution of power
does not seem to depend on the presence of a particular power elite, as
suggested by Mills (1956), that is able to intentionally prevent the
advancement of the interests of less powerful individuals. It seems rather to
be an intrinsic feature of our societies, in which democracy, rather than being
a system of procedures for the equal advancement of the interests of all
citizens, seems instead to amount to a method for the replacement of one ruling
elite with another (Schumpeter 1942); a system for which the label
‘polyarchy’ – and not ‘democracy’ – may be considered more
appropriate (Dahl 1971).
Formal political equality, based on the
equal attribution of civil liberties and rights of political participation,
gives every individual in a society equal impact (Dworkin 2000:
p. 191) on the decision making-process. However, it does not grant them
an equal opportunity of political influence (Knight and
Johnson 1997: 293), since different individuals’ power to affect political
decisions depends, among other things, on relations of power present outside
the political sphere, which are ultimately based on differences in the
possession of a variety of social resources. Accordingly, a democracy based on
the ideal of the equal distribution of political power should rely on a notion
of substantive, rather than formal, political
equality (Knight and Johnson 1997: 304). This does not mean,
however, that in order to fulfill the democratic ideal, every kind of
inequality in the distribution of social resources needs to be leveled:
Substantive political equality does not need the full realization, for example,
of economic equality in order to be at place. It only needs the elimination of
those severe inequalities in the distribution of social resources that give
rise to relations of domination. In this sense the ideal of democracy
as the equal distribution of power could be replaced by the ideal
of democracy as non-domination: it is not perfect equality of power
that needs to be sought, but severe inequalities that need to be avoided.
Distinguishing Power and Domination
A necessary step in the formulation of the
ideal of democracy as non-domination is the formulation of a definition of
domination that accounts adequately for our linguistic and moral intuitions
about the term and offers a well-founded basis for our normative claims. After
introducing, in this section, a few influential interpretations of the
distinction between power and domination, in the next two sections I shall
propose an understanding of domination on the basis of the so-called social
exchange theory (Homans 1958).
Although power and domination are frequently
used as synonyms, the latter term seems to carry more normative weight. The
contemporary literature seems to agree in understanding ‘power’ as a value-free
concept, which may refer both to situations in which the power-holder benefits
or harms the power-subject, while ‘domination’ seems to be generally
considered as an intrinsically negative evaluative concept, always implying the
presence of detrimental effects for the power-subject. Accordingly, the
distinction between power and domination has been mainly described in reference
to their effects on the interests of
the power-subject. Domination, thus, in contemporary literature has been mainly
defined as a subtype of power, referring to those cases in which power is
exercised in a way which is detrimental for the interests of those subject to
it (Allen 1998; 1999; / Lukes 2005; / Pettit 1997a; /Wartenberg 1990).
A notable exception is Jonathan Hearn (2008;
2012), who claims that domination, just like power, should be defined as a
normatively neutral concept:
If relationships of domination are common
features of our social landscape, then we need to be able to describe, analyze,
and comparatively study these, dispassionately, prior to any normative
evaluation of the relationship in question.
In line with Hearn’s position,
the analysis proposed here will suggest a value-free interpretation of
domination. Distinguishing domination from power on the basis of the
(detrimental) effects of an exercise of power on the power-subject’s interests
seems to constitute a risky strategy for two main reasons. Firstly, this is so
because domination seems to consist in the particular structure of a relation
among individuals, rather than in a particular ad hoc exercise
of power: What seems relevant in the definition of an instance of domination is
not so much whether the interests of the power-subject are actually harmed by
the power-wielder, but rather the fact that they may be harmed in some future
occasions depending on the will of the power-wielder. Accordingly, domination
should be described as a particular kind of relation that may be
potentially – but not necessarily actually – harmful for the
interests of the power-subjects. Secondly, describing domination in terms of
its effects on the interest of the power-subjects would require a strong
engagement with a particular notion of ‘interest’. A law passed by a democratic
Parliament which obliges corporations to reduce their environmental impact may
be described as actually detrimental for the corporations shareholders’
interests (when interests are defined in terms of their subjective interests,
in this case as their expected profits), although it will be very unlikely
to be described as a normatively relevant instance of domination. Accordingly,
defining domination on the basis of its detrimental effects on the interest of
the power-subjects would require a specification of the ‘kind’ of interests
which is at stake (whether ‘subjective’, ‘objective’, or both) or the even more
demanding engagement with a particular notion of ‘fundamental’ or ‘basic’
interests.
A promising line of analysis of the concept
of domination can be obtained by relying on two criteria offered by Thomas
Wartenberg in his account of the concept. According to Wartenberg (1990), the
presence of harmful effects on the interests of the power-subjects is not a
sufficient condition for domination. In order to describe a power relation as
an instance of domination, two other conditions should occur: firstly, the
relation under scrutiny should be a stable relation; secondly,
it should be ‘constituted by the existence of a power differential’
(1990: 117). Wartenberg suggests that not every exercise of power which is
detrimental for the power-subjects’ interests is to be seen as an instance of
domination. Accordingly, domination seems to indicate a more specific subfield
of ‘harmful’ power, defined on the basis of certain particular aspects that
the structure of a power relation can present, namely,
stability and the existence of a power differential.
Το άρθρο της Pamela Pansardi “Democracy,
Domination and the distribution of Power” δημοσιεύθηκε στον τόμο Revue
internationale de philosophie, “Power and Liberal Society – aspects philosophiques
du pouvoir”, 2016, 1, n. 275, Paris, pp. 91-108.
Εδώ μερικά αποσπάσματα από το άρθρο.
Τhomas E.
Wartenberg
[Thomas E. Wartenberg, “The
Forms of Power : From Domination to Transformation, Temple University Press,
1999, pp. 253.]
ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΟΓΡΑΦΟΣ
[ ανάρτηση 17 Μαϊου 2023 :
Pamela Pansardi
" Democracy, Domination
and the distribution of Power "
( Power and
Domination )
article 2016
ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΚΗ ΣΚΕΨΗ ]
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