Αριστοτέλης Πολιτικά Βιβλίο ΙΙ
κριτική στο πολίτευμα της Σπάρτης
Translated
by Benjamin Jowett
Oxford
1908
ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΚΗ ΣΚΕΨΗ
Αριστοτέλης Πολιτικά
Βιβλίο ΙΙ
In the
governments of Lacedaemon and Crete, and indeed in all governments, two points have
to be considered; first, whether any particular law is good or bad, when
compared, with the perfect state; secondly, whether it is or is not consistent
with the idea and character which the lawgiver has set before his citizens.
That in a well-ordered state the citizens should have leisure and not have to
provide for their daily wants is generally acknowledged, but there is a
difficulty in seeing how this leisure is to be attained. [ For, if you employ
slaves, they are liable to rebel.] The Thessalian Penestae have often risen
against their masters, and the Helots in like manner against the
Lacedaemonians, for whose misfortunes they are always lying in wait.
Nothing,
however, of this kind has as yet happened to the Cretans; the reason probably is
that the neighbouring cities, even when at war with one another, never form an
alliance with rebellious serfs, rebellions not being for their interest, since
they themselves have a dependent population. Whereas all the neighbours of the
Lacedaemonians, whether Argives, Messenians, or Arcadians, are their enemies
[and the Helots are always revolting to them].
In Thessaly,
again, the original revolt of the slaves occurred at a time when the
Thessalians were still at war with the neighbouring Achaeans, Perrhaebians, and
Magnesians.
Besides, if
there were no other difficulty, the treatment or management of slaves is a
troublesome affair; for, if not kept in hand, they are insolent, and think that
they are as good as their masters, and, if harshly treated, they hate and
conspire against them. Now it is clear that when these are the results the
citizens of a state have not found out the secret of managing their subject
population.
Again, the
licence of the Lacedaemonian women defeats the intention of the Spartan
constitution, and is adverse to the good order of the state. For a husband and
a wife, being each a part of every family, the state may be considered as about
equally divided into men and women; and, therefore, in those states in which
the condition of the women is bad, half the city may be regarded as having no
laws. And this is what has actually happened at Sparta; the legislator wanted
to make the whole state hardy and temperate, and he has carried out his
intention in the case of the men, but he has neglected the women, who live in
every sort of intemperance and luxury. The consequence is that in such a state
wealth is too highly valued, especially if the citizens fall under the dominion
of their wives, after the manner of all warlike races, except the Celts and a
few others who openly approve of male loves.
The old
mythologer would seem to have been right in uniting Ares and Aphrodite, for all
warlike races are prone to the love either of men or of women. This was
exemplified among the Spartans in the days of their greatness; many things were
managed by their women.
But what
difference does it make whether women rule, or the rulers are ruled by women?
The result is the same. Even in regard to courage, which is of no use in daily
life, and is needed only in war, the influence of the Lacedaemonian women has
been most mischievous. The evil showed itself in the Theban invasion, when,
unlike the women in other cities, they were utterly useless and caused more
confusion than the enemy. This licence of the Lacedaemonian women existed from
the earliest times, and was only what might be expected. For, during the wars
of the Lacedaemonians, first against the Argives, and afterwards against the
Arcadians and Messenians, the men were long away from home, and, on the return
of peace, they gave themselves into the legislator’s hand, already prepared by
the discipline of a soldier’s life (in which there are many elements of
virtue), to receive his enactments.
But, when
Lycurgus, as tradition says, wanted to bring the women under his laws, they
resisted, and he gave up the attempt. They, and not he, are to blame. for what
then happened, and this defect in the constitution is clearly to be attributed
to them. We are not, however, considering what is or is not to be excused, but
what is right or wrong ; and the disorder of the women, as I have already said,
not only of itself gives an air of indecorum to the state, but tends in a
measure to foster avarice.
The mention
of avarice naturally suggests a criticism on the inequality of property. While
some of the Spartan citizens have quite small properties, others have very
large ones ; hence the land has passed into the hands of a few. And here is
another fault in their laws; for, although the legislator rightly holds up to
shame the sale or purchase of an inheritance, he allows anybody who likes to
give and bequeath it. Yet both practices lead to the same result. And nearly
two-fifths of the whole country are held by women; this is owing to the number
of heiresses and to the large dowries which are customary. It would surely have
been better to have given nο
dowries at all, or, if any, but small or moderate ones. As the law now stands,
a man may bestow his heiress on any one whom he pleases, and, if he die
intestate, the privilege of giving her away descends to his heir. Hence,
although the country is able to maintain 1500 cavalry and 30,000 hoplites, the whole number of Spartan citizens [at the
time of the Theban invasion] fell below 1000. The result proves the faulty
nature of their laws respecting property; for the city sank under a single
defeat; the want of men was their ruin.
There is a
tradition that, in the days of their ancient kings, they were in the habit of
giving the nights of citizenship to strangers, and therefore, in spite of their
long wars, no lack of population was experienced by them; indeed, at one time
Sparta is said to have numbered not less than 10,000 citizens. Whether this
statement is true or not, it would certainly have been better to have
maintained their numbers by the equalization of property.
Again, the
law which relates to the procreation of children is adverse to the correction
of this inequality. For the legislator, wanting to have as many Spartans as he
could, encouraged the citizens to have large families ; and there is a law at
Sparta that the father of three sons shall be exempt from military service, and
he who has four from all the burdens of the state. Yet it is obvious that, if
there were many children, the land being distributed as it is, many of them
must necessarily fall into poverty.
[ Οι 5 Έφοροι - εφορεία ]
The
Lacedaemonian constitution is defective in another point; I mean the Ephoralty.
This magistracy has authority in the highest matters, but the Ephors are all
chosen from the people, and so the office is apt to fall into the hands of very
poor men, who, being badly off, are open to bribes.
There have been many examples at Sparta of this
evil in former times; and quite recently, in the matter of the Andrians,
certain of the Ephors who were bribed did their best to ruin the state. And so
great and tyrannical is their power, that even the kings have been compelled to
court them; through their influence the constitution has deteriorated, and from
being an aristocracy has turned into a democracy. The Ephoralty certainly does
keep the state together; for the people are contented when they have a share in
the highest office, and the result, whether due to the legislator or to chance,
has been advantageous. For if a constitution is to be permanent, all the parts
of the state must wish that it should exist and be maintained. This is the case
at Sparta, where the kings desire permanence because they have due honour in
their own persons; the nobles are represented in the council of elders (for the
office of elder is a reward of virtue); and the people in the Ephoralty, for
all are eligible to it. The election of Ephors out of the whole people is
perfectly right, but ought not to be carried on in the present fashion, which
is too childish. Again, they have the decision of great causes, although they
are quite ordinary men, and therefore they should not determine them merely on
their own judgment, but according to written rules, and to the laws.
Their way of
life, too, is not in accordance with the spirit of the constitution—they have a
deal too much licence; whereas, in the case of the other citizens, the excess
of strictness is so intolerable that they run away from the law into the secret
indulgence of sensual pleasures.
[ Η Γερουσία ]
Again, the
council of elders is not free from defects. It may be said that the elders are
good men and well trained in manly virtue; and that, therefore, there is an
advantage to the state in having them. But that judges of important causes should
hold office for life is not a good thing, for the mind grows old as well as the
body. And when men have been educated in such a manner that even the legislator
himself cannot trust them, there is real danger.
Many of the
elders are well known to have taken bribes and to have been guilty of
partiality in public affairs. And therefore they ought not to be irresponsible;
yet at Sparta they are so. But (it may be replied), ‘All magistracies are
accountable to the Ephors.’
Yes, but this
prerogative is too great for them, and we maintain that the control should be
exercised in some other manner. Further, the mode in which the Spartans elect
their elders is childish ; and it is improper that the person to be elected
should canvass for the office; the worthiest should be appointed, whether he
chooses or not. And here the legislator clearly indicates the same intention
which appears in other parts of his constitution; he would have his citizens
ambitious, and he has reckoned upon this quality in the election of the elders;
for no one would ask to be elected if he were not. Yet ambition and avarice,
almost more than any other passions, are the motives of crime.
Whether kings
are or are not an advantage to states, I will consider at another time; they
should at any rate be chosen, not as they are now, but with regard to their
personal life and conduct. The legislator himself obviously did not suppose
that he could make them really good men; at least he shows a great distrust of
their virtue. For this reason the Spartans used to join enemies in the same
embassy, and the quarrels between the kings were held to be conservative of the
state.
(«φιδίτια»)
Neither did
the first introducer of the common meals, called ‘phiditia,’ regulate them
well. The entertainment ought to have been provided at the public cost, as in
Crete; but among the Lacedaemonians every one is expected to contribute, and
some of them are too poor to afford the expense ; thus the intention of the
legislator is frustrated. The common meals were meant to be a popular
institution, but the existing manner of regulating them is the reverse of
popular. For the very poor can scarcely take part in them; and, according to
ancient custom, those who cannot contribute are not allowed to retain their
rights of citizenship.
[ οι ναύαρχοι - ναυαρχία [
The law about
the Spartan admirals has often been censured, and with justice; it is a source
of dissension, for the kings are perpetual generals, and this office of admiral
is but the setting up of another king.
The charge
which Plato brings, in the Laws,
against the intention of the legislator, is likewise justified ; the whole
constitution has regard to one part of virtue only—the virtue of the soldier,
which gives victory in war. And so long as they were at war, their power was
preserved, but when they had attained empire they fell, for of the arts of
peace they knew nothing, and had never engaged in any employment higher than
war.
There is
another error, equally great, into which they have fallen. Although they truly
think that the goods for which they contend are to be acquired by virtue rather
than by vice, they err in supposing that these goods are to be preferred to the
virtue which gains them.
Once more: the revenues of the state are ill-managed ; there is no money in the treasury, although they are obliged to carry on great wars, and they are unwilling to pay taxes. The greater part of the land being in the hands of the Spartans, they do not look closely into one another’s contributions.
The result which the
legislator has produced is the reverse of beneficial; for he has made his city
poor, and his citizens greedy.
Enough
respecting the Spartan constitution, of which these are the principal defects.
Πρωτότυπο αρχαίο κείμενο
Πηγή:
Πολιτικῶν
Α΄, Β΄, Γ΄, Δ΄, Ε΄, ς΄, Ζ΄, Η΄ Ἅπαντα Ἀριστοτέλους
9. Περὶ δὲ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας καὶ τῆς Κρητικῆς, σχεδὸν
δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, δύο εἰσὶν αἱ σκέψεις, μία μὲν εἴ τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ
καλῶς πρὸς τὴν ἀρίστην νενομοθέτηται τάξιν, ἑτέρα δ᾿ εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ
τὸν τρόπον ὑπεναντίως τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς πολιτείας. ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τῇ
μελλούσῃ καλῶς πολιτεύεσθαι τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν σχολήν, ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστιν·
[ εἵλωτες - εἱλωτεία ]
τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὑπάρχειν,
οὐ ῥᾴδιον λαβεῖν. ἥ τε γὰρ Θετταλῶν πενεστεία πολλάκις ἐπέθετο τοῖς Θετταλοῖς, ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ τοῖς Λάκωσιν οἱ εἵλωτες (ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐφεδρεύοντες τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι διατελοῦσιν)·
περὶ δὲ τοὺς Κρῆτας οὐδέν πω τοιοῦτον συμβέβηκεν. αἴτιον δ᾿ ἴσως τὸ τὰς
γειτνιώσας πόλεις,
[1269b] καίπερ
πολεμούσας ἀλλήλαις, μηδεμίαν εἶναι σύμμαχον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις διὰ τὸ μὴ
συμφέρειν καὶ αὐταῖς κεκτημέναις περιοίκους, τοῖς δὲ Λάκωσιν οἱ γειτνιῶντες ἐχθροὶ
πάντες ἦσαν, Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μεσήνιοι καὶ Ἀρκάδες· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς Θετταλοῖς κατ᾿ ἀρχὰς
ἀφίσταντο διὰ τὸ πολεμεῖν ἔτι τοῖς προσχώροις, Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ Πεῤῥαιβοῖς καὶ
Μάγνησιν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ τό γε τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἐργῶδες εἶναι,
τίνα δεῖ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁμιλῆσαι τρόπον· ἀνιέμενοί τε γὰρ ὑβρίζουσι καὶ τῶν ἴσων ἀξιοῦσιν
ἑαυτοὺς τοῖς κυρίοις, καὶ κακοπαθῶς ζῶντες ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ μισοῦσιν. δῆλον οὖν
ὡς οὐκ ἐξευρίσκουσι τὸν βέλτιστον τρόπον οἷς τοῦτο συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν εἱλωτείαν.
[ ἡ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἄνεσις
]
Ἔτι δ᾿ ἡ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἄνεσις καὶ πρὸς τὴν
προαίρεσιν τῆς πολιτείας βλαβερὰ καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἰκίας
μέρος ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνή, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πόλιν ἐγγὺς τοῦ δίχα διῃρῆσθαι δεῖ νομίζειν
εἴς τε τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν πλῆθος καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, ὥστ᾿ ἐν ὅσαις πολιτείαις
φαύλως ἔχει τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, τὸ ἥμισυ τῆς πόλεως εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν ἀνομοθέτητον.
ὅπερ ἐκεῖ συμβέβηκεν· ὅλην γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ὁ νομοθέτης εἶναι βουλόμενος
καρτερικήν, κατὰ μὲν τοὺς ἄνδρας φανερός ἐστι τοιοῦτος ὤν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐξημέληκεν·
ζῶσι γὰρ ἀκολάστως πρὸς ἅπασαν ἀκολασίαν καὶ τρυφερῶς. ὥστ᾿ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῇ
τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον, ἄλλως τε κἂν τύχωσι γυναικοκρατούμενοι,
καθάπερ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν στρατιωτικῶν καὶ πολεμικῶν γενῶν, ἔξω Κελτῶν ἢ κἂν εἴ
τινες ἕτεροι φανερῶς τετιμήκασι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄῤῥενας συνουσίαν. ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ
μυθολογήσας πρῶτος οὐκ ἀλόγως συζεῦξαι τὸν Ἄρην πρὸς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς
τὴν τῶν ἀῤῥένων ὁμιλίαν ἢ πρὸς τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν φαίνονται κατοκώχιμοι πάντες οἱ
τοιοῦτοι. διὸ παρὰ τοῖς Λάκωσι τοῦθ᾿ ὑπῆρχεν, καὶ πολλὰ διῳκεῖτο ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν
ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν. καίτοι τί διαφέρει γυναῖκας ἄρχειν ἢ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὑπὸ τῶν
γυναικῶν ἄρχεσθαι; ταὐτὸ γὰρ συμβαίνει. χρησίμου δ᾿ οὔσης τῆς θρασύτητος πρὸς οὐδὲν
τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, ἀλλ᾿ εἴπερ, πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, βλαβερώταται καὶ πρὸς ταῦθ᾿ αἱ τῶν
Λακώνων ἦσαν. ἐδήλωσαν δ᾿ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς· χρήσιμοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦσαν,
ὥσπερ ἐν ἑτέραις πόλεσιν, θόρυβον δὲ παρεῖχον πλείω τῶν πολεμίων. ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν
οὖν ἔοικε συμβεβηκέναι τοῖς Λάκωσιν εὐλόγως ἡ τῶν γυναικῶν ἄνεσις.
[1270a] ἔξω γὰρ τῆς
οἰκείας διὰ τὰς στρατείας ἀπεξενοῦντο πολὺν χρόνον, πολεμοῦντες τόν τε πρὸς Ἀργείους
πόλεμον καὶ πάλιν τὸν πρὸς Ἀρκάδας καὶ Μεσηνίους· σχολάσαντες δὲ αὑτοὺς μὲν
παρεῖχον τῷ νομοθέτῃ προωδοπεποιημένους διὰ τὸν στρατιωτικὸν βίον (πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει
μέρη τῆς ἀρετῆς), τὰς δὲ γυναῖκάς φασι μὲν ἄγειν ἐπιχειρῆσαι τὸν Λυκοῦργον ὑπὸ
τοὺς νόμους, ὡς δ᾿ ἀντέκρουον, ἀποστῆναι πάλιν. αἰτίαι μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αὗται τῶν
γενομένων, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἁμαρτίας· ἀλλ᾿ ἡμεῖς οὐ τοῦτο σκοποῦμεν,
τίνι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς.
τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας
ἔχοντα μὴ καλῶς ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον, οὐ μόνον ἀπρέπειάν τινα ποιεῖν
τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς καθ᾿ αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ συμβάλλεσθαί τι πρὸς τὴν φιλοχρηματίαν.
μετὰ γὰρ τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα
τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῆς κτήσεως ἐπιτιμήσειεν ἄν τις. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν
συμβέβηκε κεκτῆσθαι πολλὴν λίαν οὐσίαν, τοῖς δὲ πάμπαν μικράν· διόπερ εἰς ὀλίγους
ἧκεν ἡ χώρα. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν νόμων τέτακται φαύλως· ὠνεῖσθαι μὲν γάρ, ἢ
πωλεῖν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν, ἐποίησεν οὐ καλόν, ὀρθῶς ποιήσας, διδόναι δὲ καὶ
καταλείπειν ἐξουσίαν ἔδωκε τοῖς βουλομένοις· καίτοι ταὐτὸ συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἐκείνως
τε καὶ οὕτως.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν
σχεδὸν τῆς πάσης χώρας τῶν πέντε μερῶν τὰ δύο, τῶν τ᾿ ἐπικλήρων πολλῶν
γινομένων, καὶ διὰ τὸ προῖκας διδόναι μεγάλας. καίτοι βέλτιον ἦν μηδεμίαν ἢ ὀλίγην
ἢ καὶ μετρίαν τετάχθαι. νῦν δ᾿ ἔξεστι δοῦναί τε τὴν ἐπίκληρον ὅτῳ ἂν βούληται,
κἂν ἀποθάνῃ μὴ διαθέμενος, ὃν ἂν καταλίπῃ κληρονόμον, οὗτος ᾧ ἂν θέλῃ δίδωσιν.
τοιγαροῦν δυναμένης τῆς χώρας χιλίους ἱππεῖς τρέφειν καὶ πεντακοσίους, καὶ ὁπλίτας
τρισμυρίους, οὐδὲ χίλιοι τὸ πλῆθος ἦσαν. γέγονε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν δῆλον ὅτι
φαύλως αὐτοῖς εἶχε τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν ταύτην·
[ ὀλιγανθρωπία ]
μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν
ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ᾿ ἀπώλετο διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν. λέγουσι δ᾿ ὡς ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν προτέρων
βασιλέων μετεδίδοσαν τῆς πολιτείας, ὥστ᾿ οὐ γίνεσθαι τότε ὀλιγανθρωπίαν,
πολεμούντων πολὺν χρόνον, καί φασιν εἶναί ποτε τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καὶ μυρίους· οὐ
μὴν ἀλλ', εἴτ᾿ ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ ταῦτα εἴτε μή, βέλτιον τὸ διὰ τῆς κτήσεως ὡμαλισμένης
πληθύειν ἀνδρῶν τὴν πόλιν. ὑπεναντίος δὲ καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν τεκνοποιίαν νόμος πρὸς
ταύτην τὴν διόρθωσιν.
[1270b] βουλόμενος
γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης ὡς πλείστους εἶναι τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας, προάγεται τοὺς πολίτας ὅτι
πλείστους ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτοῖς νόμος τὸν μὲν γεννήσαντα τρεῖς υἱοὺς
ἄφρουρον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ τέτταρας ἀτελῆ πάντων. καίτοι φανερὸν ὅτι πολλῶν
γινομένων, τῆς δὲ χώρας οὕτω διῃρημένης, ἀναγκαῖον πολλοὺς γίνεσθαι πένητας.
[ ἐφορεία ]
Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐφορείαν ἔχει φαύλως. ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ κυρία μὲν αὐτὴ τῶν μεγίστων αὐτοῖς ἐστιν, γίνονται δ᾿ ἐκ τοῦ δήμου παντός, ὥστε πολλάκις ἐμπίπτουσιν ἄνθρωποι σφόδρα πένητες εἰς τὸ ἀρχεῖον, οἳ διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὤνιοι ἦσαν. ἐδήλωσαν δὲ πολλάκις μὲν καὶ πρότερον, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἐν τοῖς Ἀνδρίοις· διαφθαρέντες γὰρ ἀργυρίῳ τινές, ὅσον ἐφ᾿ ἑαυτοῖς, ὅλην τὴν πόλιν ἀπώλεσαν, καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι λίαν μεγάλην καὶ ἰσοτύραννον δημαγωγεῖν αὐτοὺς ἠναγκάζοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς, ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ συνεπιβλάπτεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν· δημοκρατία γὰρ ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας συνέβαινεν. συνέχει μὲν οὖν τὴν πολιτείαν τὸ ἀρχεῖον τοῦτο — ἡσυχάζει γὰρ ὁ δῆμος διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς μεγίστης ἀρχῆς, ὥστ᾿ εἴτε διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην εἴτε διὰ τύχην τοῦτο συμπέπτωκεν, συμφερόντως ἔχει τοῖς πράγμασιν· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μέλλουσαν σῴζεσθαι πάντα βούλεσθαι τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν κατὰ ταὐτά· οἱ μὲν οὖν βασιλεῖς διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχουσιν, οἱ δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ διὰ τὴν γερουσίαν (ἆθλον γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ αὕτη τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστιν), ὁ δὲ δῆμος διὰ τὴν ἐφορείαν (καθίσταται γὰρ ἐξ ἁπάντων) — ἀλλ᾿ αἱρετὴν ἔδει τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι ταύτην ἐξ ἁπάντων μέν, μὴ τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον ὃν νῦν (παιδαριώδης γάρ ἐστι λίαν). ἔτι δὲ καὶ κρίσεών εἰσι μεγάλων κύριοι, ὄντες οἱ τυχόντες, διόπερ οὐκ αὐτογνώμονας βέλτιον κρίνειν ἀλλὰ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ τοὺς νόμους. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ δίαιτα τῶν ἐφόρων οὐχ ὁμολογουμένη τῷ βουλήματι τῆς πόλεως· αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἀνειμένη λίαν ἐστίν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ σκληρόν, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι καρτερεῖν ἀλλὰ λάθρᾳ τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντας ἀπολαύειν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν.
[ Γερουσία - περὶ τὴν τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν ]
Ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν οὐ
καλῶς αὐτοῖς. ἐπιεικῶν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων καὶ πεπαιδευμένων ἱκανῶς πρὸς ἀνδραγαθίαν
τάχ᾿ ἂν εἴπειέ τις συμφέρειν τῇ πόλει, καίτοι τό γε διὰ βίου κυρίους εἶναι
κρίσεων μεγάλων ἀμφισβητήσιμον (ἔστι γάρ, ὥσπερ καὶ σώματος, καὶ διανοίας γῆρας)·
[1271a] τὸν τρόπον
δὲ τοῦτον πεπαιδευμένων ὥστε καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην αὐτὸν ἀπιστεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν,
οὐκ ἀσφαλές. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ καταδωροδοκούμενοι καὶ καταχαριζόμενοι πολλὰ
τῶν κοινῶν οἱ κεκοινωνηκότες τῆς ἀρχῆς ταύτης. διόπερ βέλτιον αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀνευθύνους
εἶναι· νῦν δ᾿ εἰσίν. δόξειε δ᾿ ἂν ἡ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴ πάσας εὐθύνειν τὰς ἀρχάς·
τοῦτο δὲ τῇ ἐφορείᾳ μέγα λίαν τὸ δῶρον, καὶ τὸν τρόπον οὐ τοῦτον λέγομεν
διδόναι δεῖν τὰς εὐθύνας. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἣν ποιοῦνται τῶν γερόντων κατά
τε τὴν κρίσιν ἐστὶ παιδαριώδης, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν αἰτεῖσθαι τὸν ἀξιωθησόμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς
οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ βουλόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς.
νῦν δ᾿ ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν ὁ νομοθέτης φαίνεται ποιῶν· φιλοτίμους
γὰρ κατασκευάζων τοὺς πολίτας τούτῳ κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν γερόντων· οὐδεὶς
γὰρ ἂν ἄρχειν αἰτήσαιτο μὴ φιλότιμος ὤν. καίτοι τῶν γ᾿ ἀδικημάτων τῶν γ᾿ ἑκουσίων
τὰ πλεῖστα συμβαίνει σχεδὸν διὰ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ διὰ φιλοχρηματίαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.
[ βασιλεία ]
Περὶ δὲ βασιλείας, εἰ μὲν βέλτιόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχειν
ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ μὴ βέλτιον, ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος· ἀλλὰ μὴν βέλτιόν γε μὴ καθάπερ νῦν,
ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον ἕκαστον κρίνεσθαι τῶν βασιλέων. ὅτι δ᾿ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐδ᾿
αὐτὸς οἴεται δύνασθαι ποιεῖν καλοὺς κἀγαθούς, δῆλον· ἀπιστεῖ γοῦν ὡς οὐκ οὖσιν ἱκανῶς
ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν· διόπερ ἐξέπεμπον συμπρεσβευτὰς τοὺς ἐχθρούς, καὶ σωτηρίαν ἐνόμιζον
τῇ πόλει εἶναι τὸ στασιάζειν τοὺς βασιλεῖς.
[ φιδίτια ]
οὐ καλῶς δ᾿ οὐδὲ περὶ τὰ
συσσίτια τὰ καλούμενα φιδίτια νενομοθέτηται τῷ καταστήσαντι πρῶτον. ἔδει γὰρ ἀπὸ
κοινοῦ μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν σύνοδον, καθάπερ ἐν Κρήτῃ· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Λάκωσιν ἕκαστον
δεῖ φέρειν, καὶ σφόδρα πενήτων ἐνίων ὄντων καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀνάλωμα οὐ δυναμένων
δαπανᾶν, ὥστε συμβαίνει τοὐναντίον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τῆς προαιρέσεως. βούλεται μὲν γὰρ
δημοκρατικὸν εἶναι τὸ κατασκεύασμα τῶν συσσιτίων, γίνεται δ᾿ ἥκιστα δημοκρατικὸν
οὕτω νενομοθετημένον. μετέχειν μὲν γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τοῖς λίαν πένησιν, ὅρος δὲ τῆς
πολιτείας οὗτός ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ πάτριος, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον τοῦτο τὸ τέλος φέρειν
μὴ μετέχειν αὐτῆς·
[ ναυαρχία ]
τῷ δὲ περὶ τοὺς
ναυάρχους νόμῳ καὶ ἕτεροί τινες ἐπιτετιμήκασιν, ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμῶντες. στάσεως γὰρ
γίνεται αἴτιος· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν, οὖσι στρατηγοῖς ἀιδίοις, ἡ ναυαρχία
σχεδὸν ἑτέρα βασιλεία καθέστηκεν. καὶ ὡδὶ δὲ τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ νομοθέτου ἐπιτιμήσειεν
ἄν τις,
[1271b] ὅπερ καὶ
Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις ἐπιτετίμηκεν· πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἡ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν
νόμων ἐστί, τὴν πολεμικήν· αὕτη γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. τοιγαροῦν ἐσῴζοντο
μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν μηδὲ ἠσκηκέναι
μηδεμίαν ἄσκησιν ἑτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς. τούτου δὲ ἁμάρτημα οὐκ ἔλαττον·
νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τἀγαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα δι᾿ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ἢ κακίας, καὶ
τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς, ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κρείττω τῆς ἀρετῆς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς.
φαύλως δ᾿ ἔχει καὶ περὶ
τὰ κοινὰ χρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ τῆς πόλεως ἔστιν οὐδὲν
πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένοις πολεμεῖν, εἰσφέρουσί τε κακῶς· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν
Σπαρτιατῶν εἶναι τὴν πλείστην γῆν οὐκ ἐξετάζουσιν ἀλλήλων τὰς εἰσφοράς. ἀποβέβηκέ
τε τοὐναντίον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ συμφέροντος· τὴν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀχρήματον,
τοὺς δ᾿ ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημάτους.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας ἐπὶ
τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἃ μάλιστ᾿ ἄν τις ἐπιτιμήσειεν.
ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΟΓΡΑΦΟΣ
[ ανάρτηση 15 Δεκεμβρίου 2024 :
Αριστοτέλης
Πολιτικά Βιβλίο ΙΙ
κριτική στο πολίτευμα της Σπάρτης
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
Oxford 1908
ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΚΗ ΣΚΕΨΗ ]
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